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      2. News
        COAMC News
        COAMC Group Members
        China Orient Intensively Conducts Anti-money Laundering Campaigns: Anti-money Laundering Warning Cases (II)

        According to the unified arrangements and requirements for related work of the Business Management Department of the People's Bank of China, China Orient intensively propagandas the anti-money laundering for 2020 in July this year, made more efforts to offer the propaganda and education on anti-money laundering, and advanced anti-money laundering work towards in-depth so as to contribute its efforts for effectively curbing the money laundering crime and practically maintaining economic and financial security as well as social stability. We will, this time, select the cases that involve anti-money laundering published by the People's Bank of China and give a warning of their harm and consequences through case study so as to raise the public's vigilance and ability to identify criminal activities of money laundering.

        Case III Online Gambling and Money Laundering

        Basic facts

        In the early December of 2012, the Zhangjiajie Branch of a bank monitored that an account of Wang was suddenly restarted following one year of dormancy, with active transactions involved. And frequent payments and receipts of funds occur to the accounts of Li and others in the same bank of an adjacent region. After being sent for clue investigation and case solving, the case involved in the case amounted to nearly RMB 2 billion. More than 500 accounts and RMB 24 million of funds involved in the cases were frozen. Lin, the criminal involved in the case, was convicted of the crime of opening a casino and Hu the crime of money laundering. 

        Money laundering methods

        First, opening a bank account by using others' identification certificates. Identification certificates were borrowed from friends and relatives or stolen from others to open personal bank settlement accounts. And the identity information of the actual account controllers was concealed to transfer illegal proceedings. 

        Second, manipulating domestic online banking accounts overseas to evade transaction monitoring. In this case, the online banking service was available to all personal banking settlement accounts involved in this case. Lin designated personnel to manipulate personal accounts by having access to the online banking overseas. Most transactions occurred at abnormal business hours of financial institutions so as to evade the real-time and counter monitoring by these institutions.

        Third, transferring funds fast across regions and confusing the sources of funds. The people involved in this case made frequent cross-region fund transfers and confused the sources of funds. Through decentralized transfer-in, centralized transfer-out, centralized transfer-in and distributed transfer-out, the goal of confusing the authenticity of the sources of funds in the collection accounts was finally achieved.

        Fourth, establishing a company to cover up illegal income. Lin established two technology companies and one investment enterprise in the name of his sister-in-law and friends, and used the gambling money won from the casino as lawful income of the company so as to cover up his illegal income.

        Fifth, purchasing a large number of lottery tickets. Lin incited Hu and Xia, etc. to purchase lottery tickets using the gambling money of RMB 130 million won from the casino to launder his illegal income.

        Case IV Using the Account of a Payment Institution to Run an Illegal Private bank

        Basic facts

        In 2015, Wang and others in Luoyang, Henan Province were suspected of using the account of a payment institution to run an illegal private bank. After investigation, the police arrested five criminal suspects, seized five computers as criminal tools, more than 60 bank cards and online banking UKEYs, more than 30 mobile phones involved in the case for bank transfer validation, and more than 30 Korean bank accounts with on-line banking service.

        Operation method of the illegal private bank

        First, Guo registered an account of a payment institution using the identity certificate of another person (Wang), contacted a Korean won purchaser online, and conducted transactions without substance on an online shopping platform to accept RMB transaction funds.

        Second, Jin and others in Yanji, Jilin Province provided Korean won to Guo's team through funds transfer.

        Third, Guo's team transferred the Korean won to a Korean bank account to the bank account designated by the Korean won purchaser, finally completing the transaction.

        Fourth, after the illegal private bank became mature, no online transactions without substance occurred. Instead, the bank collected RMB funds directly through the fund transfer of a payment institution. And finally, the funds were transferred by Guo's team. 

        Guo's team acted as an intermediary between the Korean won seller and purchaser to earn an exchange difference between RMB and Korean won.

        (The cases mentioned this time are excerpted from A Collection of Typical Cases of Anti-money Laundering Regulation, China Financial Publishing House, Anti-money Laundering Bureau of the People's Bank of China, etc.)